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Note
People v. Madej: Illinois' Violation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations
Brook M. Bailey*
I. INTRODUCTION
How can we expect protection under [the Vienna Convention] for
American citizens abroad if we do not extend equal protection to
foreign nationals residing in the United States? The answer is, we
cannot. The decision reached in this case thus has implications
reaching far beyond the execution of this defendant.l
In 1982, Gregory Madej was convicted and sentenced to death for the
gruesome murder of Barbara Doyle. 2  Nearly sixteen years later, his
native country of Poland-an opponent of the death penalty-learned of
Madej's arrest and trial for the first time. 3  On August 10, 2000, a
divided Illinois Supreme Court rejected both Madej's and the Polish
Government's pleas for relief under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.4 Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that an
arresting State must notify a foreign national5 of his right to contact his
* J.D. expected May 2002. I would like to thank my editor, Renee Sotos, who gave
generously of her time in reading and commenting on numerous drafts, and to the board and
members of the Loyola Law Journal for their advice on technical matters. Thanks also to Patrick
McFadden and Amarjeet Bhachu, both of whom provided me with intellectual stimulation for
which I am grateful. Finally, I would like to express my thanks to my friends and family for their
encouragement during the writing process. I greatly appreciate the loving support of my family
Gwen and Gerald Bailey, Morgana Bailey, and especially my husband, Chad Herring, for their
inspiration and confidence in me.
I. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423,432 (IIl. 2000) (Heiple, J., dissenting).
2. See People v. Madej, 478 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Il1. 1985); infra Part III.A (recounting the facts
surrounding the murder of Barbara Doyle).
3. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 432 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 429.
5. For the purpose of consular notification, a "'foreign national' is any person who is not a
U.S. citizen." U.S. ST. DEP'T, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS I (Jan. 1998), available
at http://www.state.gov/www/globallegal-affairs/ca-notification/ca-part3.pdf [hereinafter State
Department Manual].
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consul 6 and notify proper foreign authorities that one of their citizens
has been detained. 7  Illinois did not deny that it failed to meet its
obligation under this international treaty. 8 A remedy, however, for such
violations cannot be found in the Vienna Convention, nor are U.S.
courts willing to provide any relief.9
As of June 2000, eighty-seven foreign nationals from twenty-eight
different countries were on death row in the United States. 10 While not
all of these foreign nationals allege that they were deprived of their
rights under the Vienna Convention, there is overwhelming evidence
that the failure on the part of the United States to notify them of their
rights is the rule rather than the exception." State violations of the
Vienna Convention cause a great outcry of disapproval from foreign
countries, human rights organizations, and the general public.' 2 Given
the increase in litigation on these claims, a claim that meets all of the
procedural requirements inevitably will be brought, forcing the courts to
conceive a remedy for state violations. 13  Further, the international
reaction to United States treaty violations will pressure the United States
into taking concrete measures to ensure treaty compliance. 14
6. The United States State Department defines a "consul" or "consular officer" as:
[A] citizen of a foreign country employed by a foreign government and authorized to
provide assistance on behalf of that government to that government's citizens in a
foreign country. Consular officers are generally assigned to the consular section of a
foreign government's embassy in Washington, DC, or to consular offices maintained
by the foreign government in locations in the United States outside of Washington,
DC.
Id. at 1.
7. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
8. See Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 430 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
9. Infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the courts disapproval of remedies for Vienna Convention
violations).
10. As of June 2000, Amnesty International had the names of eighty-seven foreign nationals
of twenty-eight nationalities who are sentenced to death in the United States. United States of
America: Worlds Apart- Violations of the Rights of Foreign Nationals on Death Row-Cases of
Europeans, at *9, at http://amnesty.it/ailib/aipub/2000/AMR/251 10100.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2000) [hereinafter Worlds Apart].
11. Mark Warren, Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign Nations and the Death Penalty
in the United States, at http://www.oranous.conjustice/foreignnationals.html (Sept. 26, 1999).
12. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in
Chicago, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87752, 87725, 87726); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Human Rights
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales in Support of the Defendant-Appellant, Madej (Nos.
87574, 87752, 87725, 87726); Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican States, Madej (Nos.
87574, 87752, 87725, 87726).
13. Cara O'Driscoll, Comment, The Execution of Foreign Nationals in Arizona: Violations of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 323, 339 (2000).
14. Infra Part V.B (outlining the international reaction to United States violations of the
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This Note begins with a discussion on the background of the Vienna
Convention. 15 Next, this Note outlines how the United States Supreme
Court avoided interpreting the rights and remedies contained in the
Vienna Convention by choosing, instead, to focus on the procedural
issues. 16  Additionally, this Note describes three fundamental issues
federal and state courts consider when confronted with Vienna
Convention violations: whether the Vienna Convention confers a private
right of action on an individual; 17 whether a state can be compelled to
comply with the treaty; 18 and whether suppression of evidence or
dismissal of an indictment are appropriate remedies. 19 This Note then
examines the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling on the procedural
obstacles in the case of People v. Madej.20 Additionally, this Note
critiques the majority's failure to address a remedy for a state violation
of the Vienna Convention, which led to the confirmed execution of a
foreign national. 2' Finally, this Note assesses the potentially
antagonistic reaction the international community will have on state
violations of the treaty and outline possible measures states can take to
avoid future violations. 22
II. BACKGROUND
In the mid-1960s, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
codified consular law. 23  Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is of
special importance to foreign nationals because it confers a right to
communicate and to meet with their consulate. 24  The extent of the
rights and remedies for violations under Article 36, however, are much
debated by United States federal and state courts.25 When the United
Vienna Convention).
15. Infra Part II.A (discussing the advent of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
the resulting treaty).
16. Infra Part II.B.1 (outlining the United States Supreme Court ruling in Breard v. Greene).
17. Infra Part II.B.2 (discussing whether a private right of action can be gleaned from Article
36).
18. Infra Part II.B.3 (examining states' compliance with the Vienna Convention).
19. Infra Part Il.B.4 (discussing remedies that courts have found are inappropriate for state
violations of the Vienna Convention).
20. Infra Part IV.A (discussing the limitations section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure place on Vienna Convention claims in Illinois).
21. Infra Part IV.B (analyzing the majority's failure to consider the policy arguments for
overlooking the procedural obstacles).
22. Infra Part V (outlining the impact of the Madej rulings and similar rulings on the
international community).
23. Infra Part II.A (discussing the codification of consular law).
24. Infra Part II.A (discussing rights contained in the Vienna Convention).
25. Infra Part II.B (examining the interpretation of rights and remedies under Article 36).
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States Supreme Court refused to provide concrete guidance on these
issues in Breard v. Green,26 courts developed judicially-created tests to
avoid any direct interpretation of the Vienna Convention.27
A. The Historical Development of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations
Bilateral consular agreements formed between nations as early as the
seventeenth century. 28  These agreements established diplomatic
relations between two states2 9 and primarily functioned to protect
nationals in foreign countries. 30  Conflicting treaties, however, caused
frustration 31 and rapid developments in international law after the
Second World War prompting the need for a uniform system of
consular law. 32 Consequently, in 1963, states from diverse political and
economic backgrounds came together in Vienna, Austria, to set
universal standards for diplomacy and international law.33
On March 2, 1963, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 34
convened with ninety-two states participating. 35  The purpose of the
Vienna Convention was to establish guidelines for a consul's duties,
rights, and privileges. 36 While the seventy-nine articles 37 of the Vienna
Convention treaty were assembled with general ease, Article 36 became
a source of much conflict and debate. 38 Article 36 was eliminated from
the original draft39 and was revived only two days prior to the end of the
26. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam) [hereinafter Breard III].
27. Infra Part Il.B.2 (highlighting the use of the prejudice test in state and federal courts).
28. Constantin Ecomid~s, Consular Treaties, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 37, 38
(Elsevier Sci. Publishers B.V., 1986).
29. Id. at 35.
30. Id. at 40.
31. See LUKE LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 18 (2d ed. 1991).
32. See id. at 23.
33. Id. at 25.
34. Vienna Convention, supra note 7.
35. LEE, supra note 31, at 25. The Convention built upon its predecessor conference, the
United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Relations, which took place two years earlier and set
the stage for a productive and agreeable adoption of the Articles. Id. at 24.
36. Gregory Dean Gisvold, Note, Stranger in a Strange Land: Assessing the Fate of Foreign
Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authorities, 78 MINN. L. REV. 771,
780 (1994).
37. The Vienna Convention contains seventy-nine articles and is divided into five chapters:
"consular relations in general; facilities, privileges and immunities relating to consular posts,
career consular officers and other members of a consular post; the regime relating to honorary
consular officers and consular posts headed by such officers; general provisions; and final
provisions." Ecomids, supra note 28, at 39.
38. LUKE LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 107 (1966).
39. Id. Article 36 did not get the necessary two-thirds majority vote and thus was eliminated.
[Vol. 32
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Convention.n° The dispute over Article 36 centered on whether a duty
should be imposed on the arresting State to notify the detainee's State of
the detainment and to allow for unimpeded communication and
visitation between the detainee and consul. 41 After multiple defeated
drafts and much deliberation, 42 Article 36 was finally adopted and
incorporated in the Vienna Convention Treaty.
43
The original draft provided:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals
of the sending State:
(a) Nationals of the sending State shall be free to communicate with and to have
access to the competent consulate, and the consular officials of that consulate shall be
free to communicate with and, in appropriate cases, to have access to the said
nationals;
(b) The competent authorities shall, without undue delay, inform the competent
consulate of the sending State if, within its district, a national of that State is committed
to prison or to custody pending trial or detained in any other manner. Any
communication addressed to the consulate by the person in prison, custody or detention
shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without undue delay;
(c) Consular officials shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who
is in prison, custody or detention, for the purpose of conversing with him and arranging
for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a
judgement [sic].
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however,
that the said laws and regulations must not nullify these rights.
2 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records, at 23-24 U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.25/6, U.N. Sales. No. 63.X.2 (1963).
40. LEE, supra note 38, at 112-13.
41. Id. at 107.
42. Id. at 112-13.
43. The adopted Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states in relevant
part:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals
of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State
and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same
freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the
sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and the arrange
for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a
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The revised Article 36 enables governments to provide for the safety
of their citizens abroad and to avoid international conflicts resulting
from the mistreatment of persons detained in foreign countries.
44
Specifically, Article 36 details the procedures an arresting State must
follow when a foreign national is detained.45 The arresting State is
required to notify a detained foreign national that he has a right to
communicate and meet with his consul.4 6 Furthermore, the State must
notify the proper authorities of the detainee's State that a foreign
national is in custody. 47  The Article gives no specific timelines for
these notification requirements; rather, these procedures must be done
"without delay." 48
The United States officially ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969.49
As a result, the treaty became binding law pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. 50  The Vienna Convention
itself has been called "the single most important event in the entire
judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of
a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso,
however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.
Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100-01.
44. See William J. Aceves, Treaties-Vienna Convention on Consular Relations-consular
access to detained nationals-habeas corpus-Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 87, 89-90 (1998).
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 100-01.
46. Id. (stating that "[tihe said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of
his rights under this subparagraph" (emphasis added)).
47. Id. (stating that "the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of the sending State if... a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner").
48. Id. The Vienna Convention emphasizes the urgency of honoring these rights "without
delay" stating that:
[T]he receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending
State .... Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested ... shall also be forwarded by said authorities without delay. The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
subparagraph ....
Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36 (1), 21 U.S.T. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
49. 115 CONG. REc. S30997 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1969).
50. Article VI, clause two of the United States Constitution reads in full:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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history of the consular institution." 51  Any dispute about the role of
consular relations cannot be settled without reference to the Vienna
Convention and the resulting treaty.52  Since its ratification, some
United States courts found the treaty's language unequivocal on its
face. 53 These same courts, however, struggle with interpretation of this
language, attempting to provide individuals with rights and remedies
when a state violates the treaty. 54
B. The Construction and Destruction of the Vienna Convention in
United States Federal and State Courts
United States courts first dealt with the Vienna Convention in the
context of United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
hearings.55  These cases considered an INS regulation 56 created to
ensure compliance with Article 36 and, thus, did not confront specific
provisions in the treaty. 57  More recently, courts have confronted the
actual language of Article 36 in both deportation hearings and in
criminal cases. 58 Even so, given the paucity of precedent on this treaty,
51. LEE, supra note 31, at 26.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Boochever, J., dissenting) (stating that "the language of the provision is not precatory, but rather
mandatory and unequivocal"), cert. denied, 2000 WL 798553 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2000); United States
v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "the language of the Vienna Convention... is
anything but ambiguous"), cert. denied, 2000 WL 723038 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2000) (Torruella, J.
dissenting); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d. 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring)
[hereinafter Breard II] (stating that "[t]he language is mandatory and unequivocal, evidencing the
signatories' recognition of the importance of consular access for persons detained by a foreign
government"), aff'd per curium sub nom., Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curium);
People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Il1. 2000) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (stating that "[t]he language of the treaty 'is mandatory and unequivocal, evidencing the
signatories' recognition of the importance of consular access for persons detained by a foreign
government"') (quoting Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J.,
concurring)).
54. infra Part 1I.B (discussing various court rulings on Vienna Convention violations in the
context of immigration hearings).
55. See Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rangel-Gonzales,
617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
56. Infra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the claims pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 242.2
in United States v. Calderon-Medina).
57. Infra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the claims pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 242.2
in United States v. Calderon-Medina).
58. See William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 276-82 (1998) (comparing cases
brought under federal regulations in deportation hearings with cases brought under the Vienna
Convention in criminal proceedings).
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state and federal courts created tests to address three fundamental
questions regarding the implementation of the Vienna Convention.
First, courts considered whether the Vienna Convention confers a
private right of action on an individual. 9 Second, courts examined
whether a state can be compelled to comply with the treaty.6° Finally,
courts examined whether dismissal of indictment or suppression of
evidence are appropriate remedies for a state violation of the Vienna
Convention.61 The development of these tests is due, in part, to the
United States Supreme Court's failure to provide guidance to state and
federal courts about how to deal with state violations of the Vienna
Convention.62
1. The Procedural Default Doctrine and Breard III
In the landmark case of Breard 111,63 the United States Supreme
Court had its first opportunity to confront the issue of a state's violation
of the Vienna Convention. 64 In 1992, Angel Francisco Breard was
convicted and sentenced to death by a Virginia trial court for the murder
of Ruth Dickie. 65 Upon the affirmation of his conviction and sentence
by the Virginia Supreme Court, 6 6 Breard filed a motion to the federal
district court for habeas relief, alleging that his rights were violated
when the authorities failed to inform him of his rights under the Vienna
Convention. 67 The district court rejected his claim because he failed to
59. Infra Part II.B.2 (discussing whether a private right of action can be gleaned from the
treaty).
60. Infra Part II.B.3 (examining whether a state can be compelled to comply with an
international treaty).
61. Infra Part II.B.4 (discussing options considered by courts to remedy a state violation of the
Vienna Convention). Due to this Note's focus on the Illinois case of People v. Madej, the
background section will primarily concentrate on court decisions that are binding or persuasive
precedent to Illinois Supreme Court decisions. Given the scant authority on Vienna Convention
violations in Illinois, however, cases from other jurisdictions are incorporated in order to develop
a thorough backdrop upon which to view the Madej ruling.
62. Infra Part II.B.l (outlining the failure on the part of the United State Supreme Court to
provide guidance on state violations of the Vienna Convention).
63. Breard II1, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
64. Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147, 149
(1999).
65. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994).
66. Id.
67. Breard III, 523 U.S. at 373.
[Vol. 32
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raise the issue in state court, thereby procedurally defaulting the claim.68
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 69
In an eleventh-hour plea to the Supreme Court,70 Breard argued that
the Vienna Convention should trump the state procedural default
doctrine in federal court because it is an international treaty.7' In a 6-3
decision to deny certiorari, the Supreme Court commented that Breard's
claim was procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise this claim in
state court.72 The Court stated the Vienna Convention intended for state
procedural rules to govern the implementation of the treaty.73
Additionally, the Court speculated that even absent procedural
preemption, Breard could not show that the state's failure to inform him
of his rights prejudiced74 the outcome of the trial.75
The three justices who argued in favor of granting certiorari argued
that the Court's refusal to review the case was made too hastily,
especially given the international context.76  The "entire case was
mooted" when Breard was executed that night.77 The Supreme Court
68. Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Va. 1996) [hereinafter Breard I].
The procedural default doctrine is based on the procedural status of a claim. See Breard 111, 523
U.S. at 375. By definition, procedurally defaulted claims are claims that cannot be decided on the
merits because they have been time-barred. See id.
69. Breard 11, 134 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that petitioner's claim under the
Vienna Convention procedurally defaulted because it was not raised in the state court), aff'd per
curium sub noma., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curium).
70. The Paraguayan government did not find out about Breard's detainment until three years
after he entered death row. Luna & Sylvester, supra note 64, at 148. Even then, the government
was notified by Breard's family, not by the United States government. Id.
71. BreardIII, 523 U.S. at 375.
72. Id. at 375-76.
73. Id. at 375. The Court held, "By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court,
Breard failed to exercise his rights under the Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of
the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Having failed to do so, he cannot raise a
claim of violation of those rights now on federal habeas review." Id. at 375-76.
74. Infra Part II.B.2.c (discussing the prejudice test which is a judicially-created test that
petitioners can use to show that a remedy is necessary because the state's violation of the Vienna
Convention prejudiced the outcome of their trial).
75. Breard I11, 523 U.S. at 377. The Court stated, "[N]o such showing could even arguably be
made. Breard decided not to plead guilty and to testify at his own trial contrary to the advice of
his attorneys, who were likely far better able to explain the United States legal system to him than
any consular official would have been." Id. Responding to Breard's claim that he was prejudiced
by not knowing of his right to contact his consul, the Court stated this claim is "far more
speculative than the claims of prejudice courts routinely reject in those cases were [sic] an inmate
alleges that his plea of guilty was infected by attorney error." Id.
76. Id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court was deprived of the normal time
for consideration of this case); id. at 380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the petitioner's
arguments are without merit, but the court has not had enough time to consider all the issues); id.
at 381 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the stay of execution should be granted).
77. Luna & Sylvester, supra note 64, at 149.
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side-stepped a number of critical questions that had been brewing in
many state and federal courts regarding the interpretation of the Vienna
Convention, including: whether an individual has a private right of
action under the Vienna Convention; 78 whether a state can be compelled
to notify foreign nationals of their rights under the treaty; 79 and whether
suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment are appropriate
remedies for violations of this treaty. 80 By failing to provide guidance
to state and federal courts, the Supreme Court set the stage for
considerable confusion about how to deal with state violations of the
Vienna Convention.
2. The Right to Consular Assistance under Article 36
A major source of confusion for United States courts is whether an
individual has a private right of action under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention. 8' Typically courts circumvent this determination by first
ascertaining whether an individual even has standing to allege a treaty
violation. 82 If no determination on standing can be made, then courts
look directly at the text of the treaty and official documents to see if any
explicit right of action is provided for an individual.83 Finally, some
78. Infra Part II.B.2 (discussing whether a private right exists for an individual in the Vienna
Convention).
79. Infra Part II.B.3 (examining a state's duty of compliance with an international treaty).
80. Infra Part II.B.4 (discussing possible remedies courts have examined when confronted
with a state violation of the Vienna Convention).
81. See United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, Nos. 99-2721, 99-2874, 2000 WL 1182450, at
*4 (7th Cir. Aug. 21, 2000) (assuming that a private right is created by the Vienna Convention);
United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that even if a
private right is assumed to exist, the remedy sought is not provided for by the treaty), cert. denied,
2000 WL 798553 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2000); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000)
(refusing to address directly whether private right is created by holding that remedy sought by
defendants is inappropriate), cert denied, 2000 WL 723038 (U.S. Oct 30, 2000); Murphy v.
Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the Vienna Convention cannot be
construed to create individual rights); United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th
Cir. 1980) (holding that defendant has a private right under the Vienna Convention); United
States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to decide whether
individual has private right); United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857 (N.D. I11. 1999)
(holding that a private right of action is a threshold issue); United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp.
2d 178, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (S.D.
Cal. 1999) (finding that Article 36 creates individual rights), aff'd, 2000 WL 1256890 (9th Cir.
(Cal.) Sept. 5, 2000); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253 (D. Utah 1999)
(holding that it is doubtful that a private right exists); People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ill.
2000) (implying that defendant would have a private right of action if claim not time-barred);
People v. Villagomez, 730 N.E.2d 1173, 1182 (I11. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that the Vienna
Convention arguably confers a private right, but Article 36 does not create a fundamental right).
82. Infra Part II.B.2.a (discussing whether an individual has standing to allege a treaty
violation).
83. Infra Part II.B.2.b (examining the text of the Vienna Convention).
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courts avoid addressing this issue altogether by using a judicially-
created prejudice test to show that regardless of whether a private right
is provided for an individual, the foreign national's case was not biased
by a state violation of the treaty.
84
a. Standing to Allege a Treaty Violation
In Breard III, the Supreme Court only suggested that the Vienna
Convention "arguably" confers an individual the right to contact his
consulate upon arrest.85  Thus, in determining whether the Vienna
Convention confers a private right of action on an individual, courts first
consider whether an individual has standing to allege a treaty
violation. 86 In United States v. Carrillo,87 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois held that standing to assert rights under the
Vienna Convention was a threshold issue in determining whether there
was a right of action under the treaty.88  While no Seventh Circuit
precedent existed on the issue of standing under the Vienna
Convention, 89 the court noted the frequency with which this issue has
been litigated in other courts. 90 Due to the varied holdings from these
84. Infra Part II.B.2.c (demonstrating the use of the prejudice test).
85. Breard I1, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) (the Court stated that the Vienna
Convention "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest").
86. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 857. In the fall of 1998, Anselmo Carrillo and two other men were detained by the
Drug Enforcement Agency because of alleged involvement with drug trafficking. Id. at 855.
Carrillo signed a waiver to have his car searched for narcotics. Id. After they were arrested and
informed of their Miranda rights, Carrillo and the other men were charged with drug possession
and intent to distribute. Id. at 856. After the court order, the men made a motion to dismiss their
convictions and suppress the evidence based on the claim that they were not told of their rights to
consular notification under the Vienna Convention. Id. The court found no authority for such a
claim, and their motion was denied. Id. at 862.
89. The court found that under a different treaty, the Seventh Circuit previously stated that
"'individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of a
protest by the sovereigns involved."' Id. at 858 (quoting Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d
255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990)). Thus, under that authority, the "[diefendants appear to lack standing to
assert individual rights under Article 36" because the sovereign State failed to assert any rights on
behalf of the foreign nationals involved. Id. at 858.
90. Id. at 858-59. The court cited the following cases and their relative status on standing:
United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1242-43 (9th Cir.1999)
(concluding that an individual has standing), withdrawn, Oct. 1, 1999 188 F.3d 1177,
1999 WL 787431 at *1; United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181-83
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that an individual probably does have standing, but declining
to decide the issue conclusively); United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d
931, 933 (C.D. I11. 1999) (concluding that an individual has standing); United States v.
Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); United States v.
Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 988-89 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (following Lombera-
Camorlinga to conclude that an individual has standing); United States v. Kevin, 97
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courts on whether standing to assert a right exists, the court in Carrillo
did not decide whether standing existed, but rather turned to the
language of the treaty to investigate whether a private right is explicitly
conferred. 91
b. The Text of the Treaty is Ambiguous as to Whether a Private Right
Exists
The Supreme Court has instructed that, when construing a treaty,
courts must first look to the plain words of the treaty.92 Article 36 states
that
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State .... Any communication addressed to the consular post
by the person arrested... shall also be forwarded by said authorities
without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph .... 93
While this language appears to provide certain benefits to an individual,
the question of whether the treaty confers a private right of action is
unclear. 94 The first sentence of Article 36 and the preamble to the
Vienna Convention suggest that the purpose of the treaty is to
standardize consular activities, not to aid a foreign detainee.9 The
focus of this language seems to aid the consul in carrying out his
CR 763JK, 1999 WL 194749, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1999) (addressing but declining
to decide the issue of standing); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250,
1253 (D. Utah 1999) (stating that it is "doubtful" that an individual has standing, but
declining to decide the issue conclusively); United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d
672, 678 (D.V.I. 1999) (concluding that an individual has standing); United States v.
Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. 111.1999) (same); United States
v. $69,530.00, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 594 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (same, in a civil forfeiture
case); United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (stating
that the issue is "murky" and that several factors indicate individual standing, but
declining to decide the issue conclusively); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.
Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (discussing whether the Vienna Convention is "self-
executing" and suggesting that an individual does not have standing), aff'd, 134 F.3d
622 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va.
407, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (1998) (stating that Article 36 creates no legally enforceable
individual rights).
Id.
91. Id. at 859.
92. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992).
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36(l)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
94. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that "[e]ven where a treaty
provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state ... it is traditionally held that any
rights arising from such provisions are, under international law, those of states and.., that
individual rights are only derivative through states"' (quoting Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896
F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) (alternations in original)).
95. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36(1), pmbl., para. 5, 21 U.S.T. at 100.
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responsibilities to nationals in foreign states.96  Additionally, the
preamble states that "the purpose of such privileges and immunities is
not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of
functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States." 97 This
clause implies the treaty is intended to benefit the consular, not the
detained individual.98
In United States v. Li,99 the First Circuit interpreted the preamble to
the Vienna Convention as "explicitly disclaim[ing] any attempt to create
individual rights."' l° Moreover, the court in Li found that the Article 36
language was ambiguous as to whether individual rights are created at
all.l 0 1 Due to the ambiguity of the treaty, the court turned to non-textual
sources to decipher the meaning of Article 36.102 The Li court took
special note of the U.S. State Department's opinion on whether treaties
create individual rights. 103 After reviewing court documents submitted
by the State Department, the court found that the State Department
concluded that the Vienna Convention establishes state-to-state rights
and obligations, not the rights of individuals. 1°4 The court explained
that any individual rights found in the Vienna Convention were merely
derivative of the state's right to extend consular communication and
protection. 105
In holding that individual rights were not provided for in the Vienna
Convention, the Li court refused to decide the case at bar based on
whether the treaty provided a foreign national with a private right of
action. 10 6 Rather, the court focused its holding on the fact that the treaty
did not provide for the remedy sought by the defendants. 10 7 Such
96. Id. (focusing on "facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the
sending State").
97. Id. at pmbl., para. 5.
98. Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and
Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 37 (2000).
99. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
100. Id. at 62.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 63 (stating, "To the extent that the treaty's terms are ambiguous.., rely upon non-
textual sources 'such as the treaty's ratification history and its subsequent operation."' (quoting
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989))).
103. Id. The court referred to the State Department's views that "treaties do not create
individual rights at all." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (referring to the State Department's conclusion that "[t]he right of an individual to
communicate with his consular official is derivative of the sending state's right to extend consular
protection to its nationals when consular relations exist between the states concerned").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 66. The court concluded that "[t]he remedies sought by appellants are unavailable
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avoidance is not uncommon in U.S. courts given the ambiguities and
confusion about interpreting an international treaty and the potential
impact a lower court decision could have internationally.10 8 Rather than
analyzing the meaning behind the treaty's text, most courts move
directly to a prejudice analysis as a way of avoiding such
interpretation. 109
c. The Prejudice Test
In the late 1970s, courts began to inquire whether the Vienna
Convention conferred a private right of action on an individual by
considering whether the detainee was prejudiced by the state's
violation. 110 In United States v. Calderon-Medina,"' the defendants
alleged that in a prior deportation hearing they were not informed of
their right to contact their consul, 112 and that their deportation was,
therefore, unlawful." 3 The Ninth Circuit decided not to resolve this
issue directly and instead created a test to determine if such violations
prejudiced the rights of the alien. 114  The court thus established a two-
part prejudice test. The first part of the test inquires whether the
regulation served to benefit the detainee."15 The second part of the test
to them under.., the Vienna Convention .... Therefore, irrespective of whether [the Vienna
Convention] ... create[s] individual rights, the defenses asserted must be denied." Id.; see also
supra Part II.B.4 (discussing the various court holdings based on inappropriate remedies).
108. Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565, 602 (1997). Kadish states, "Courts considering
the issue of Article 36 violations have generally avoided the issue of whether an individual right
exists by moving directly to a prejudice analysis." Id.
109. See, e.g., Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997); Waldron v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511 (2nd Cir. 1996); Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir.
1996); United States v. RangeI-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979); Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D.
Va. 1996).
110. See, e.g., Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.
1980); United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rangel-
Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
111. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 530.
112. The defendants alleged that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 the INS violated its own
regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e)(1978). Id. at 530. This regulation states, "Every detained alien
shall be notified that he may communicate with the consular or diplomatic officers of the country
of his nationality." 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (2000). This statute was created to correspond with and
ensure compliance with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 531
n.6.
113. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 530.
114. Id. at 531 (stating, "Violation of a regulation renders a deportation unlawful only if the
violation prejudiced [the] interests of the alien which were protected by the regulation").
115. Id.
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asks whether the violation of the regulation prejudiced the detainee."16
Under this initial test, the foreign national had the burden of proving his
defense was prejudiced by demonstrating he was unable to understand
the legal proceedings due to his status as a foreigner or language
barriers. 17  As long as a court found that no prejudice occurred, the
question of whether Article 36 established a private right for individuals
could be avoided.' 1
8
As appeals based on Vienna Convention violations increased, the
scope of the prejudice test narrowed. 19 Courts adopted a new test
which held that in order to establish prejudice, the foreign national had
to provide evidence demonstrating that (1) he did not know of his rights,
(2) that he would have pursued his rights under the treaty, and (3) the
consul would have assisted him. 120  Under both tests, only one
defendant has been able to prove successfully that a state violation of
the Vienna Convention prejudiced his defense. 121 This small number is,
116. Id.
117. Gisvold, supra note 36, at 801 (finding that the test gives the defendant an opportunity to
show "his alienage, language disability, or lack of sufficient understanding of the legal
proceedings against him, harmed his defense sufficiently to merit reversal").
118. United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (N.D. I11. 1999) (stating, "While
several factors weigh in favor of recognizing a private fight of action under Article 36, this court
agrees with those courts that have found it unnecessary to decide the issue conclusively").
119. See, e.g., United States v. Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at *3 (4th Cir. 1998)
(stating that the defendant must show prejudice to suppress evidence under Article 36); Faulder v.
Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting habeas petitioner's claim under the
Convention on the ground that any assistance he might have obtained from his consulate would
have had no effect on his defense); United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182-84
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that defendant did not provide enough evidence to prove his case was
prejudiced); United States v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that
prejudice was not demonstrated by the defendant because he never attempted to contact his
consular while in prison); United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (holding that defendant could not prove prejudice because she was fully informed of her
Miranda rights); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 (D. Utah 1999)
(holding that defendant could not show that failure to contact consular would have made
difference in trial); United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(denying motion to suppress evidence under an Article 36 claim because prejudice was not
shown). But see United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931, 933 (C.D. Ill. 1999)
(skipping any discussion of prejudice and proceeding to what is the appropriate remedy).
120. United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (finding that
"[t]o establish prejudice, the defendant must produce evidence that (1) he did not know of his
right; (2) he would have availed himself of the right had he known of it; and (3) there was a
likelihood that the contact with [the consul] would have resulted in assistance to him"); accord,
Illinois v. Villagomez, 730 N.E.2d 1173, 1183 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (holding that "[t]o establish
prejudice, a defendant must show that (1) he did not know of his right to contact the consulate for
assistance; (2) he would have availed himself of the right; and (3) there was a likelihood that the
consulate would have assisted defendant").
121. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980). One source indicates
that the deciding factor in the defendant's successful showing of prejudice in Rangel-Gonzales
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in part, due to the defendant's burden of meeting the high standard of
the prejudice test. 122 Unsatisfied with the prejudice test as a dispositive
factor in denying a remedy to a foreign national, courts further
questioned whether a state can even be compelled to enforce a treaty
123
and then addressed whether the remedy sought is appropriate under the
Vienna Convention. 124
3. State Compliance with the Vienna Convention
A fundamental question of whether a state can be compelled to
comply with the Vienna Convention is entangled with the issue of
whether an individual has rights under the treaty. A treaty is "an
agreement between two or more states or international organizations
that is intended to be legally binding and is governed by international
law."'125  Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, a ratified treaty has the
dignity of an act of Congress. 126  In the seminal case of Missouri v.
Holland,127 the United States Supreme Court held that the Supremacy
Clause 128 permits Congress to impose regulations on states in areas that
was the superior legal counsel the defendant received. The showing of prejudiced included:
[T]he defendant's affidavit stating that he did not know that he could contact his consul
and that he would have contacted the consul if he had known he could; an affidavit
from the consul stating the steps he would have taken when notified of the defendant's
detention; and the affidavit of an experienced immigration attorney stating that, if the
defendant had obtained consular assistance, he would have obtained a better result in
the case.
Linda Jane Springrose, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens Under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 185, 192
(1999).
122. One observer noted that "[tihe current state of the law puts too great a burden on
defendants to prove that they were prejudiced by not having been advised of their right to contact
consul." Springrose, supra note 121, at 213; see also Luna & Sylvester, supra note 64, at 189.
Luna and Sylvester state that "a violation of the Vienna Convention should be presumptively
prejudicial to the defendant and must be met with affirmative government evidence to the
contrary." Id. They further argue that upon determining a state violation has occurred, "the
burden should be placed on the government to demonstrate that no prejudice has accrued to the
defendant's case." Id.
123. Infra Part II.B.3 (examining state compliance with the Vienna Convention).
124. Infra Part II.B.4 (discussing possible remedies for a state violation of the Vienna
Convention).
125. LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 184-85 & n.36 (2d ed.
1996) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF FOREGN RELATIONS LAW § 301, Preface n.2, adapting Article
1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
126. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (stating that the "Constitution [of the
United States] places [treaties] in the same category as other laws of Congress by its declaration
that 'this Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which
shall be made under authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land"').
127. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
128. Article VI, clause two of the United States Constitution reads in full:
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the federal government would not otherwise have any independent
source of authority. 129  Congress' treaty power is plenary, the Court
held, and is carried out by the "necessary and proper" clause. 30 Once a
treaty is ratified by two-thirds vote in Congress, it becomes binding law
and is essentially the equivalent of a federal statute, which is superior to
all conflicting state statutes. 13 1 As a result, a treaty does not violate the
Tenth Amendment rights of the states and must, therefore, be complied
with. 1
32
Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have drawn on some
unresolved ambiguities in Missouri v. Holland.133 These cases indicate
that the federal government may be barred from compelling states to
implement treaties because commandeering states to enact federal
programs violates the Tenth Amendment. 134  In the context of an
individual's rights under the Vienna Convention, commentators have
noted the ominous refusal at the state level to notify foreign nationals of
the right to contact their consul. 135 For example, in the period since the
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976, Arizona has executed three
foreign nationals without notifying them of their rights under the Vienna
Convention. 136  Therefore, the constitutionality of requiring a state to
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
129. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
130. Id. at 432. The "necessary and proper" clause, found in article 1, section 8 of the United
States Constitution, provides the federal government with the power to take all measures that are
"necessary and proper" in executing their enumerated powers. Id. The Constitution reads, "[t]o
Make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States
or in any Department or Officer Thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, cl. 18.
131. Holland, 252 U.S. at433.
132. Id. at 434.
133. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not compel
local governments to perform administrative functions for the federal government because "such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty");
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (finding that Congress may not simply
commandeer the legislative process of the states by compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program).
134. Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial Involvement in
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV. 307, 324 (1999).
135. Detlev Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458, 461 (1998) (noting
the "ominous ... refusal or neglect to notify foreign nationals arrested in the United States of
their right to communicate with their consul").
136. O'Driscoll, supra note 13, at 323 (stating that "[s]ince the death penalty was reinstated in
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comply with a treaty is uncertain and, accordingly, as long as this issue
remains unclear, state violations of the Vienna Convention will
continue. 137
4. Suppression of Evidence and the Exclusionary Rule
The Vienna Convention does not provide a remedy for state
violations of the treaty. Nonetheless, foreign nationals have sought to
have their indictment dismissed or evidence suppressed when it was
obtained through a violation of the treaty. 138
There are, however, several instances where a foreign national has
sought suppression of evidence that is obtained in violation of the
Vienna Convention. 139 Similar to the rationale behind the application of
the exclusionary rule, 140 foreign nationals argue that if evidence can be
suppressed when it is obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention,
arresting authorities will be deterred from violating the detainee's
1976, Arizona has executed three foreign nationals.., after failing to notify their home country
of their arrest").
137. Vadnais, supra note 134, at 323.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 2000 WL
723038 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2000) (noting that appellant argued dismissal of indictment and
suppression of confession as a remedy for Vienna Convention violation); United States v.
Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd, No. 99-50597, 2000 WL
1256890 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (stating that defendant argued that suppression of evidence and
dismissal of indictment were appropriate remedies); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170
F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 2000 WL 798553 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2000)
(recounting that defendant argued that suppression of evidence was sufficient remedy); United
States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (D. Utah 1999) (noting that defendant
sought suppression of confession as a remedy for a Vienna Convention violation); United States
v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that appellant argued that
suppression of statement is an appropriate remedy); United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854,
856 (N.D. I11. 1999) (stating that appellants sought dismissal of the charges against them and
suppression of certain evidence obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention).
139. See, e.g., Li, 206 F.3d at 66 (holding that dismissal of indictment and suppression of
confession was not a remedy available under the Vienna Convention); United States v. Alvarado-
Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993-94 (S.D. Cal. 1999), affd, No. 99-50597, 2000 WL 1256890 (9th
Cir. Sept. 5, 2000) (suppression of evidence and dismissal of indictment were inappropriate
remedies); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999)
(suppression of evidence was insufficient remedy); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp.
2d 1250, 1254-55 (D. Utah 1999) (suppression of confession not a remedy for a Vienna
Convention violation); United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(suppression of statement is an inappropriate remedy); Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (dismissal
of the indictment and suppression of evidence is not a remedy for a Vienna Convention
violation).
140. When an individual's constitutional rights are violated, invoking the exclusionary rule
allows for evidence to be suppressed because it was obtained in violation of a detainee's rights.
Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (discussing the
Fifth Amendment)).
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rights. 14 1  The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Chaparro-
Alcantara,142 however, held that suppressing evidence is not an
appropriate remedy under the Vienna Convention because the treaty
does not expressly provide for suppression of evidence. 143  The court
held that imposing this judicially-created remedy would be improper
because it is only within the power of the legislature to apply the
exclusionary rule to a treaty-based right.' 44 The court also found that no
other countries allowed for suppression of evidence as a remedy to
treaty violations because such a ruling would "promote disharmony in
the interpretation of an international agreement."' 145  Consequently, as
the court in Chaparro-Alcantara found, most courts maintain that
violations of Article 36 do not require that courts dismiss 46 an
indictment or suppress evidence. 147
Courts have consistently considered the above three fundamental
issues when confronted with state violations of the Vienna Convention.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in August 2000, examined a factually
similar case, People v. Madej,148 which addressed whether a foreign
national's conviction and death sentence should be voided under
international law because of Illinois' violation of the Vienna
Convention. 14
9
III. DIscusSION
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed an Illinois violation of the
Vienna Convention in People v. Madej.150  In a 4-3 decision, the court
refused to provide a remedy for Madej's claim, holding that the claim
141. Kelly Trainer, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United States
Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 227, 263 (2000); see also United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp.
2d 178, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the exclusionary rule cannot be invoked for violation
of a treaty because such rights do not rise the level of constitutional rights).
142. United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2000).
143. Id. at 621.
144. Id. at 622 (finding that "[o]nly the legislature can require that the exclusionary rule be
applied to protect a statutory or treaty-based right").
145. Id. at 622. The court cites the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, stating that
"[tireaties that lay down rules to be enforced by the parties through their internal courts or
administrative agencies should be construed so as to achieve uniformity of result despite
differences between international legal systems." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 325 cmt. d (1987).
146. United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
147. Supra note 139 and accompanying text (examining the various holdings of courts
regarding remedies for state violations of the Vienna Convention).
148. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (Il. 2000).
149. Id.
150. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (Il1. 2000).
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was procedurally barred under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.151
Three Justices in two powerful dissents, however, illuminated the
profound policy arguments favoring a remedy to the state violation. 152
A. The Facts
On August 23, 1981, at 5:00 a.m. the Chicago police observed an
automobile drive through a stop sign.' 53 The driver of the car, Gregory
Madej, refused to stop and a high-speed chase through the city ensued
between the police and Madej. 154 After twenty-year-old Madej drove
into an alley and attempted to escape by foot, police apprehended
him. 155 The police observed that Madej's arms and face were covered
with blood and scratches. 156
Earlier that morning, Madej had been drinking and smoking
marijuana at a bar with a woman named Barbara Doyle. 157 The two left
the bar and had sex twice in Doyle's car. 158 Doyle bought some drugs
from Madej, but then made the mistake of attempting to steal more
drugs from him. 159 Madej saw a baggie under Doyle's leg and pushed
her.16° She pulled out a knife and a struggle ensued. 16 1 Doyle's naked
body was found at 5:30 a.m., and forensic evidence showed that she had
been stabbed approximately thirty-four times and run over by her own
car. 
162
B. Prior Court Decisions in People v. Madej
Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Madej
was convicted 163 of one count of murder' 64 and three counts of felony-
151. Infra Part Im.C.I (discussing the majority holding that the Vienna Convention claim was
procedurally barred).
152. Infra Part III.C.2 (outlining Justice McMorrow and Justice Heiple's dissent).
153. People v. Madej, 478 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ill. 1985).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 395.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. People v. Madej, 685 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Ill. 1997).
163. Madej, 478 N.E.2d at 394.
164. 38 ILL. REV. STAT. 9-1(a)(1) (1979) (current version at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1
(1998 & Supp. 1999)).
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murder,165 which were predicated on the felonies of armed robbery, 166
rape, 167 and deviate sexual assault. 168 The court sentenced him to death
on the three murder counts and to thirty years imprisonment for the
predicate felonies. 169  Madej appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court in
April 1985,170 but the Illinois Supreme Court rejected all of his
arguments. 171 Then, in October 1985, the United States Supreme Court
denied Madej's petition for a writ of certiorari. 172 Two months later, the
United States Supreme Court denied Madej's petition for rehearing. 173
Thereafter, pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 174 Madej
filed a pro se motion for relief. Several years later his attorney filed an
amended petition. 175 The circuit court dismissed the amended petition,
and Madej appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. 176 The court again
165. Id. § 9-1(a)(3) (current version at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (1998 & Supp. 1999)).
166. Id. § 18-2 (current version at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-2 (1998 & Supp. 1999)).
167. Id. § 11-I (current version at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13 (1998)).
168. Id. § 11-3 (repealed by P.A. 83-1067, § 28, eff. July 1, 1984; P.A. 83-1362, Art. II, § 40,
eff. Sept. 11, 1984)
169. People v. Madej, 478 N.E.2d 392, 394 (111. 1985). The thirty years imprisonment was to
be served concurrently for the counts of armed robbery and rape. Id.
170. Id. Madej argued that he was wrongly convicted based on the unconstitutionality of the
death penalty, ineffective assistance of counsel, a drug and alcohol defense, unproven felonies,
improper waiver of jury for sentencing, and the circuit court's abuse of discretion. Id.
171. The court found that the death penalty was not unconstitutional pursuant to the court's
reasoning in People v. Owens. Id. at 396 (citing People v. Owens, 464 N.E.2d 261 (Ill. 1984)).
The court held that Madej was not denied effective assistance of counsel because the defendant
did not show there was a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have been different if
not for counsel's unprofessional errors as required by Strickland v. Washington. Id. at 398 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Madej's drug and alcohol defense was rejected
because the court held that it is "no defense to criminal conduct unless the intoxication is so
extreme as to make impossible the existence of a mental state which is an element of the crime,"
and Madej failed to show that "he was not able to act knowingly." Id. at 398-99. The claims of
unproven felonies were adequately found by the trial court given the surrounding facts. Id. at
399. The court further found that the defendant had properly waived his right to a jury for his
sentencing hearing because he signed a typewritten waiver form and made an intelligent and
voluntary waiver. Id. at 399-401. Finally, the court found that the lower court considered all
mitigating factors and properly used its discretion in rejecting the defendant's testimony. Id. at
401.
172. Madej v. Illinois, 474 U.S. 935 (1985).
173. Madej v. Illinois, 474 U.S. 1038 (1985).
174. 38 ILL. REV. STAT. 122-1 (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-
1(2000)). The Post-Conviction Hearing Act "provides a mechanism by which those under
criminal sentence in [Illinois] can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial
denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both."
People v. Coleman, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1070 (I11. 1998) (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/122-
1 (West 1994)).
175. People v. Madej, 685 N.E.2d 908, 913 (I11. 1997).
176. Id. The court heard arguments on mitigating evidence, the nonunanimity rule, death
penalty eligibility, ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and ineffective assistance of counsel
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affirmed the circuit court's ruling and denied Madej's petition for post-
conviction relief. 177 At no time throughout these initial proceedings did
Madej raise a claim for relief under the Vienna Convention.
In July 1998, Madej filed a petition in the criminal division under
section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure seeking relief
from judgment. 178  Madej also filed a mandamus petition in the
chancery division because of local court rules. 179 In December 1998,
the Polish Consul General was granted leave to intervene in the
mandamus proceeding, and the entire matter was transferred to Judge
Thomas Fitzgerald, who was presiding over the section 2-1401 claim. 180
Subsequently, Judge Fitzgerald denied both petitions and the matter was
appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. 181
C. Illinois Supreme Court's Ruling in People v. Madej
1. Majority Decision
Madej and the Consul General appealed the lower court ruling to the
Illinois Supreme Court. 182 In a 4-3 ruling, 183 Justice Rathje confronted
the issue of a defendant's rights under the Vienna Convention in
Illinois. In an untraditional examination 184 of the Vienna Convention,
the court considered whether state law procedurally preempted Madej's
claim under the Vienna Convention. 185  The court also examined
on appeal. Id. at 915-30.
177. Id. at 932. The court found that Madej's mitigation argument was inadequate because he
did not show that more evidence or better counsel would have made a difference at the hearing.
Id. at 920. The court further rejected Madej's argument on the nonunanimity rule. Id. at 921.
Furthermore, the court did not find that Madej was ineligible for the death penalty because of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 922. The court also found that Madej did not suffer
prejudice because of inappropriate attorney conduct such that he had ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial. Id. at 923.
178. People v. Madej, No. 98-CH-10183 (1999).
179. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 423 (Ill. 2000).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Justice Rathje wrote for the majority, see id. at 425-29, Justice Bilandic specially
concurred, see id. at 429, Justice Morrow concurred in part and dissented in part, see id. at 429-
31, Chief Justice Harrison dissented and joined Justice Heiple's dissent, see id. at 431-32, Justice
Heiple dissented, see id. at 432.
184. The Madej court is the first court to apply international law strictly without imposing any
judicially-created tests, which distinguishes this ruling from the background cases discussed thus
far. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the distinction between the Madej ruling and its predecessor
cases).
185. Infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text (discussing the application of section 2-1401
of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure).
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whether the state's failure to conform to the Convention constituted
fraudulent concealment such that the statute of limitations should be
tolled. 186  Furthermore, the court considered whether Poland could
intervene in the action pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure.187 Finally, the court examined whether Madej's
sentence and conviction were void under international law. 188
The crux of the majority's rationale for denying Madej relief was the
petitioner's failure to overcome the state procedural hurdles. 189  The
court held that Madej was procedurally preempted from bringing his
claim because section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
served as a bar. 190 According to section 2-1401, a petition to obtain
relief from a judgment must be filed within two years after the entry of
that judgment.' 91  Madej argued, however, that he could not be
prevented by a state procedural rule from seeking an international law
remedy because he was not notified of his rights under the Vienna
Convention. 192 In response, the court cited the analysis in Breard 111,193
which stated that a court must look at the text of the treaty and the
drafting history in order to determine whether the state's procedural
rules govern its implementation. 194  The Madej court found that,
because the Vienna Convention explicitly stated that the treaty should
be "exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving state," 195 Illinois procedural rules govern the defendant's
rights under the treaty. 196 Thus, the court held that the defendant had
"ample opportunity to raise his claim and have it considered on the
186. Infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (examining the possibility of fraudulent
concealment on the part of Illinois).
187. Infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text (examining Poland's intervention claim under
section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure).
188. Infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text (discussing the application of restitutio in
integrum).
189. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 426 (III. 2000).
190. Id.
191. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1401(c) (West 1998) (stating that "the petition must be
filed not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment").
192. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 428.
193. Breard lll, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
194. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 428 (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486
U.S. 694, 700 (1988)); see also Breard II, 523 U.S. at 375; supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Breard
III).
195. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at 101.
196. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 429.
2001]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
merits during trial,"' 197 and, therefore, there was no basis to conclude
that the state law frustrated the treaty. 1
98
Madej further argued that the statue of limitations should be tolled
because the state fraudulently concealed his rights under the Vienna
Convention.' 99 Under Illinois law, a petitioner can seek relief two years
after a ruling is handed down provided that the petitioner can show he
was "under duress, or a legal disability, or that grounds for relief were
fraudulently concealed." 200 The court found that a showing of fraud
must be an affirmative act that is aimed at preventing relief.20' The
court found that Madej could not make the requisite showing because
the state did not affirmatively act to prevent the petitioner from learning
of his rights under the Vienna Convention. 20 2 Indeed, the court implied
that such rights could hardly be fraudulently concealed because the
rights could be found in treaties around the world.20 3
The court also considered Poland's petition to intervene in the section
2-1401 motion. 204 The court laid out the same section 2-1401 standard
for bringing a claim within the applicable time period.20 5 Poland argued
that it did not intervene earlier because it only recently discovered that
its citizen had been convicted and sentenced to death.20 6 Without
determining whether Poland had a right to bring a claim under the
Vienna Convention, the court held that the claim was time-barred
because Poland could not prove that they suffered from duress, fraud, or
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at427-28.
200. Id. at 426 (citing People v. Caballero, 688 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. 1997) (holding that a
petitioner who filed a motion for post-conviction relief and relief from a judgment pursuant to
section 2-1401 of the Civil Practice Law was not entitled to relief after two years of the date of
judgment absent a showing of legal disability, duress or fraud)).
201. Id. at 427-28 (stating that fraud "must consist of 'affirmative acts or representations
designed to prevent discovery of the cause of action or ground for relief."' (quoting Crowell v.
Bilandic, 411 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ill. 1980))).
202. Id. at 428.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 427. The Petitioner's Joint Brief states:
The Republic of Poland also was unaware that Gregory Madej had been arrested and
detained in violation of the Vienna Convention pending trial, and was therefore unable
to render any timely assistance. As a result, Gregory Madej was forced to rely upon
the efforts of his inexperienced trial counsel. ... [T]he results were disastrous.
Joint Brief for Defendant-Appellant Gregory Madej and Intervenor-Appellant the Consul General
for the Republic of Poland in Chicago at 7, People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 2000).
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a legal disability.20 7  Thus, because the statute of limitations had
expired, Poland's motion to intervene was denied. °8
Finally, the majority also rejected the defendant's argument that his
conviction and sentence were void under the principle of restitutio in
integrum.2 0 9 The court held that an order is only void when a court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties.2 10 In this case,
the court had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties. 211
Thus, because the petitioner did not cite any further authorities other
than the dictionary on this matter, the majority held that there was no
reason to conclude that the defendant's conviction and sentence were
void. 2  The court upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence
concluding that his untimely petition simply could not be heard because
the petitioner had already been given ample time and opportunity to
litigate the issues.2
1 3
2. The Dissenting Opinions
a. Justice McMorrow's Dissent
Departing from the majority's affirmation of the death sentence,
Justice McMorrow argued that the state's clear violation of the Vienna
Convention required a remedy. 214 The dissent reasoned that the state
had a duty to inform Madej of his rights under the Vienna Convention
given the "mandatory and unequivocal" language in the treaty.215
Hence, Justice McMorrow concluded that there was no question that the
state's failure to inform the defendant of his rights under an
international treaty is a serious violation of international law, especially
considering that the death penalty was being imposed.216 Justice
207. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 427.
208. Id.
209. The court accepted the petitioner's definition of restitutio in integrum:
In the civil law, restoration or restitution to the previous condition. This was effected
by the pretor on equitable grounds, at the prayer of an injured party, by rescinding or
annulling a contract or transaction valid by the strict law, or annulling a change in the
legal condition produced by an omission, and restoring the parties to their previous
situation or legal relations. The restoration of a cause to its first state, on petition of the
party who was cast, in order to have a second hearing.
Id. at 426-27 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (6th ed. 1990)).
210. Id. at 427.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. id. at 429.
214. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
215. Id. at 430 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
216. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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McMorrow referenced a recent ruling from the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, which stated that when a state fails to observe an
individual's rights under Article 36, imposition of the death penalty is a
violation of international law and is an arbitrary deprivation of life.2 17
This holding, the dissent continued, was consistent with that court's
previous ruling that death penalty cases must maintain a "high standard
of procedural accuracy." 218 Given this international context, as well as
Poland's substantial interest in this case,219 the dissent argued that any
procedural obstacles were overshadowed by the "extraordinary" nature
of this case. 220
Justice McMorrow further illuminated the profound impact that the
majority's ruling could have on a global scale. 221  According to the
Justice, the safety and freedom enjoyed by United States citizens all
over the world is seriously endangered when international treaties are
not honored.222 The United States simply cannot expect that Americans
abroad will be given their rights under the Vienna Convention if the
same rights are not provided for foreign nationals in the United
States.223 Therefore, in considering the nation's own self interest, the
Justice found that it was best to acknowledge the violation and provide
an appropriate remedy. 224  Justice McMorrow called for the vacation of
217. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice McMorrow noted that
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recently held that,
[Flailure to observe a detained foreign national's right to information, recognized in
Article 36(l)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, is prejudicial to the
due process of law and, in such circumstances, imposition of the death penalty is a
violation of the ight not to be deprived of life 'arbitrarily,' as stipulated in the relevant
provisions of the human rights treaties.
Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For the full opinion of the Inter-
American Court, see The Right to Information about Consular Assistance Within the Framework
of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, par. 141.7, October 1, 1999.
218. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 430 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating
that the Inter-American Court's holding "mirrors this court's own recognition that death penalty
cases require a 'high standard of procedural accuracy."' (quoting People v. Walker, 91 Ill.2d 502,
517 (1982))).
219. Infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Poland interest in intervention).
220. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
221. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
222. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 228 (1895)).
223. Id. at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice McMorrow
stated, "[W]e cannot expect that the citizens of this country, while abroad, will be afforded their
rights under the Vienna Convention, or indeed, under any treaty, if we do not afford those same
international rights to foreign nationals here in the United States." Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
224. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "[iut is in our own
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Madej's death sentence and for the case to be remanded for further
hearings on this violation.
225
b. Justice Heiple's Dissent
In a separate dissent, Justice Heiple disagreed with the majority's
affirmation of Madej's conviction and death sentence. 226 Justice Heiple
found that the state violated a clear duty and, thus, relief should be
afforded to the petitioner. 227 The Justice stated that if equal protection
is not extended to foreign nationals in this country, the United States
cannot expect protection under this treaty for Americans abroad.228 He
added that the majority's decision had implications that reached beyond
this defendant's execution. 229  Consequently, Justice Heiple's dissent
held that the conviction and sentence should be reversed and a new trial
should be ordered in compliance with the treaty. 230
IV. ANALYSIS
The court in Madej correctly held that section 2-1401 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure barred Madej's claim. 231 The majority ruling
was procedurally accurate, and the court properly applied both
international and state law, thereby not frustrating the purpose of the
Vienna Convention. 232 In dealing exclusively with the procedural issue,
the court did not preclude a foreign national from bringing a timely
Vienna Convention claim in Illinois. 233 The majority, however, failed
self-interest to uphold the principle of international comity, acknowledge the notification
violation that occurred in the case at bar, and provide a remedy").
225. Id.
226. Id. at 432 (Heiple, J., dissenting). The Justice sarcastically noted that the majority had
not specified whether the letter of apology to the Polish government "would be sent before or
after defendant's execution." Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Harrison joined Justice Heiple's dissent, but also dissented separately and stated that
the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 431-32 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 432 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Justice Heiple asked, "[H]ow can we expect protection
under this treaty for American citizens abroad if we do not extend equal protection to foreign
nationals residing in the United States?" Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting). Answering his own
question, Justice Heiple stated, "The answer is, we cannot." Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihe decision reached in this case thus has
implications reaching far beyond the execution of this defendant").
230. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 428-30 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 428 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
233. Infra Part IV.A (discussing the majority's correct procedural ruling).
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to provide a remedy for Illinois' violation of the Vienna Convention,
which ultimately allowed for the execution of a foreign national.234
A. The Majority's Proper Application of International and State Law
The court's analysis in Madej is strikingly dissimilar from its
predecessors. 235 Not only did the Madej court noticeably omit the three
fundamental issues addressed by most courts,236 but it also cited only
one factually similar case in which a state violated the Vienna
Convention.237  Many courts spend a great deal of time determining
whether an individual has standing, whether the treaty confers a private
right of action, whether prejudice exists, and whether the state can be
compelled to enforce the notification requirement.238  These issues,
however, have been unnecessarily examined 239 by courts in order to
avoid confronting international issues in domestic courts. 24°  This
provincialism 24 1 in United States courts skirts the application of
international law in exchange for judicially-imposed tests and doctrines
234. Infra Part IV.B (analyzing the court's failure to account for the strong policy arguments).
235. Compare the issues raised in the Madej ruling with those raised in United States v. Li,
206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing prejudice and suppression of evidence as a remedy);
United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
denial of motion to suppress without making determination of prejudice was reversible error);
United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (N.D. I11. 1999) (examining standing, private
right of action, language of the treaty, and suppression of evidence as an insufficient remedy);
United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989-90 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (requiring
showing of prejudice and held that suppression of evidence was inappropriate remedy); United
States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that suppression of
confession was an insufficient remedy for a Vienna Convention violation); United States v.
Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096-97 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that prejudice must be
demonstrated); State of New Jersey v. Cevallos-Bermeo, 754 A.2d 1224, 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000) (requiring showing of prejudice to bring Vienna Convention claim).
236. Supra Part II.B (identifying three fundamental questions that courts address: (1) whether
the Vienna Convention confers a private right of action on an individual; (2) whether a state can
be compelled to comply with the treaty; and (3) whether suppression of evidence or dismissal of
indictment a remedy for violation of the Vienna Convention).
237. The court cited only the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Breard 111.
Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 428.
238. Supra Part II.B (discussing court findings on the issues of standing, private right of
action, prejudice, and state compliance under the Vienna Convention).
239. One court even admits that it is unnecessary to decide these issues conclusively because
the remedy sought by the defendant, typically suppression of evidence or reversal of indictment,
is not warranted by Article 36. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
240. Patrick McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 7
(1995) (identifying three ways that U.S. courts marginalize international law: jurisdictional
provincialism, doctrinal provincialism, and methodological provincialism).
241. Id. at 5 (stating that provincialism is "an institutional, almost reflexive, animosity toward
the application of international law in U.S. courts").
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that result in inconsistent applications of international law.24 2 Doctrinal
provincialism, specifically, relates to the development of judicially-
created rules in situations where international law already provides the
necessary guidance. 243  Reflecting upon the case history of state
violations of the Vienna Convention, it becomes clear that these courts
applied judicially-created tests where international law already provided
guidance.
244
The Madej ruling is unique because the Illinois Supreme Court
applied pure international law and the requisite state procedures as
stipulated by the Vienna Convention. 245  The majority ruling can be
distinguished from the line of cases confronting the Vienna Convention
because it restrained itself from using judicially-created tests.
Specifically, by omitting the use of these tests, the court implicitly
assumed that the petitioner had standing, that the treaty supplied a right
of action, that no prejudice existed, and that Illinois must comply with
the treaty. 246 The only issue the court confronted was whether the
242. Id. McFadden states:
Over the past 200 years, United States judges have developed a series of rules and
practices that minimize the role of international law in domestic litigation. Considered
collectively, these rules and practices embody a thoroughgoing, deeply rooted
provincialism .... As a consequence, international law plays almost no part in the
judicial business of the United States. It is rarely discussed in American cases, and
almost never provides the rule of decision upon which court judgments turn.
Id. at 5. McFadden goes on to state that "the rules and doctrines of judicial provincialism arise
haphazardly-whenever a situation or lawsuit makes them relevant. Random confrontations and
compartmentalized treatment hide the larger picture . I..." d. at 7.
243. Id. at 11 (stating that doctrinal provincialism "refers to the judiciary's use of rules that
restrict when international law can provide the rule of decision in a court's judgment").
244. Id. at 13 (stating that "[t]he end result [of judicial provincialism] is that U.S. courts
seldom decide international cases on the basis of international law").
245. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 428 (Ill. 2000).
246. Compare the issues raised in the Madej ruling with those raised in United States v. Li,
206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing prejudice and suppression of evidence as a remedy);
United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that denial
of motion to suppress without making determination of prejudice was reversible error); United
States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (examining standing, private right of
action, language of the treaty, and suppression of evidence as an insufficient remedy); United
States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989-90 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (required showing of
prejudice and held that suppression of evidence was inappropriate remedy); United States v.
Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that suppression of
confession was an insufficient remedy for a Vienna Convention violation); United States v.
Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096-97 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that prejudice must be
demonstrated); State of New Jersey v. Cevallos-Bermeo, 754 A.2d 1224, 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000) (requiring showing of prejudice to bring Vienna Convention claim). McFadden
states that judicially-created rules and doctrines "help to minimize the role of international law in
U.S. courts: standing requirements, the political question doctrine, the rule that treaties may not
be invoked in U.S. courts unless they are self-executing .... " McFadden, supra note 240, at 7.
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petitioner's claim was procedurally time-barred.247
The court correctly held that the Vienna Convention governs the
procedures by which the treaty is to be implemented.248 The court
agreed with Madej's assertion that it is necessary to turn directly to the
treaty itself to determine the procedure for dealing with a treaty
violation. 249  Citing Breard III, the majority held that when applying
international law, a court must look at the text of the treaty to determine
whether the state's procedures should govern. 250  The Vienna
Convention states that the rights contained in a treaty "shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State .... ,251 The Supreme Court in Breard III interpreted this
provision to mean that the State's procedural rules should govern the
treaty's implementation in that state. 252 The majority in Madej adopted
this proper reading of the Vienna Convention and held that Illinois'
procedural rules direct the implementation of the Vienna Convention. 253
After determining that the Vienna Convention endorsed the use of
state procedural law, the court turned to section 2-1401 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure to determine the possibility of relief from
judgment.254 The statute clearly indicates that a section 2-1401 petition
must be filed "not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or
judgment., 255  After the expiration of two years, relief will not be
considered unless the petitioner can show that he suffered from duress, a
legal disability, or that relief was fraudulently concealed.256 Because
the petitioner made no showing that the state affirmatively acted to
247. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 428 (I11. 2000).
248. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36, 21 U.S.T., at 101.
249. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 428. The court noted the "[diefendant acknowledges that the
Supreme Court has held that, to determine whether a state's procedural rules govern, a court must
look to the treaty's text and drafting history." Id.
250. Id. (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988) and
Breard II1, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam)). In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengelsellschaft v.
Schlunk, the Court stated that "[w]hen interpreting a treaty, we begin 'with the text of the treaty
and the context in which the written words are used."' Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 700
(quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 534
(1987), which quotes Air Franc v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985))
251. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 36, 21 U.S.T., at 101.
252. Breard 111, 523 U.S. at 375 (stating that "absent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that
State").
253. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 428.
254. Id. at 426.
255. Id. (quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1401(c) (West 1998)).
256. Id. (citing People v. Caballero, 688 N.E.2d 658, 660-61 (I11. 1997)).
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conceal the petitioner's rights, the claim of fraud could not be proved.
257
This accurate reading of the Illinois statute of limitations under section
2-1401 reveals that Madej's claim for relief under the Vienna
Convention was indeed barred by the state's procedural rules.
The majority's analysis implied that Madej could have sought some
measure of relief from the state's violation of the Vienna Convention
before the claim was barred.258 Indeed, at no point did the court deny
that the state violated the treaty. Given the majority's interpretation of
the Vienna Convention, Madej could have sought relief under this claim
at any time before a final judgment, for two years after the entry of
judgment, or after two years upon a showing of duress, legal disability,
or fraud.259 Nor did the court deny giving full effect to the treaty by
using section 2-1401 because Madej had a substantial opportunity and
period of time in which he could have sought relief.260  Instead, the
court pragmatically held that limiting claims to a reasonable amount of
time is in the public's interest and complies with international law.
261
By appropriately addressing whether Madej's claim could be tolled
under section 2-1401, the court not only avoided doctrinal
provincialism, but it also did not unnecessarily preclude a petitioner in
Illinois from bringing a timely Vienna Convention violation claim as
many other courts have done. 262  Rather, the Illinois Supreme Court
only concluded that the time for bringing such claims under section 2-
1401 must be reasonably limited.263
B. Policy Arguments for Setting Aside the Procedural Obstacles
While the court correctly applied international law in this ruling,
Illinois' failure to comply with an international treaty is a profound
issue the court should have addressed. Engrossed in its focus on
257. Id. at 427-28 (citing Crowell v. Bilandic, 411 N.E.2d 16 (1980)). In Crowell, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated, "It is well established that fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll a
statute of limitations requires affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent discovery of
the cause of action or ground for relief." Crowell, 411 N.E.2d at 18.
258. See Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 428.
259. Id. at 426.
260. Id. at 428. The court stated, "We do not believe that a reasonable limitation period
designed to preserve the public's interest in the finality of judgments can be construed as a rule
that frustrates the purposes of the Vienna Convention." Id.
261. Id. The court further explained, "Because the treaty specifically states that the forum
court's rules and regulations will govern, we have no basis to conclude that the reasonable
limitation period violates international law." Id.
262. Supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing various court holdings that preclude
the possibility of bringing a timely Vienna Convention claim).
263. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 428.
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procedure, the majority did not address the fact that Madej's failure to
raise the Vienna Convention claim was, at least in part, due to the fact
that Illinois breached its duty by not complying with an international
treaty. 264 The majority failed to address the powerful policy arguments
that exist for setting aside procedural obstacles such as section 2-
1401.265 Specifically, the court did not address the state's violation of
international law, Poland's strong interest in avoiding the execution of
one of its citizens, and the ramifications for United States citizens
abroad.
1. The State's Violation of International Law
Illinois violated international law when it failed to notify Madej of
his rights under the Vienna Convention. 26  The state's omission
constituted a failure to meet an affirmative duty to inform the detainee
of his right to consular access which is clearly set forth in the treaty. 267
Justice McMorrow's dissent illuminated this point, stating that the
treaty's language "is mandatory and unequivocal. 268 The critical role
of Article 36 cannot be overstated as evidenced by the debates at the
Vienna Convention. 269  During the debate, the United States delegate
stated that the notification requirement was useful and could be
practically implemented.27 ° Other countries also strongly support the
rights contained in Article 36.271 These accounts elucidate the
264. Id. at 428-29 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This is especially
noteworthy because the Northern District of Illinois addressed these issues in United States v.
Carrillo. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the Carrillo court held that standing to assert rights
under the Vienna Convention was a threshold issue in determining whether a right of action under
the treaty existed, for which the court turned to the language of the treaty itself). The Appellate
Court of Illinois for the First District addressed these issues in Illinois v. Villagomez, 730 N.E.2d
1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). The Seventh Circuit addressed these issues post-Madej in United
States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, Nos. 99-2721, 99-2874, 2000 WL 1182450 (7th Cir. Aug. 21,
2000).
265. Id. at 429 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice McMorrow
noted, "[Tihis is an extraordinary case. More is at stake here than the rights of a single
defendant." Id. at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
266. Id. at 429-30 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
267. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
268. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
269. Joint Brief for Defendant-Appellant Gregory Madej and Intervenor-Appellant the Consul
General for the Republic of Poland in Chicago at 16, People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 2000).
270. The United States report stated the notification requirement "ha[d] the virtue of setting
out a requirement which [was] not beyond means of practical implementation in the United
States, and at the same time, [was] useful to the consular service of the United States in the
protection of [its] citizens abroad." Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna, Austria, March 4 to April 22, 1963, Sen. Doc. Exec.
E., 91st Cong., 1st Ses. (1969).
271. Joint Brief for Defendant-Appellant Gregory Madej and Intervenor-Appellant the Consul
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importance of consular notification and, accordingly, the seriousness of
a violation. 272  Thus, given this powerful policy issue, the majority
should have attempted to afford the petitioner a remedy for the state's
violation and the potential prejudice it caused the petitioner. 273
2. Poland's Strong Interest in Avoiding the Execution of Madej
Poland officially banned the death penalty in 1997, after a two-year
moratorium. 274  Accordingly, it has a strong interest in avoiding the
execution of one of its citizens.275  Nonetheless, the United States did
not notify Poland of Madej's arrest, much less his death sentence, until
sixteen years after his conviction and sentence. 276 Poland contended
that the Polish Consulate in Chicago would have assisted Madej upon
General for the Republic of Poland in Chicago at 16-17, People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (II.
2000). The Petitioner's Brief noted the positions of several countries on the need for Article 36:
Drafting parties offered the following comments: failure to include Article 36 in the
Vienna Convention would constitute "an admission of dismal failure" (India); "it
would be a lamentable failure on the part of the Conference" not to adopt Article 36
(France); country "very concerned" at failure to include Article 36 (Yugoslavia);
without Article 36, "the convention would be unsatisfactory and incomplete" (Federal
Republic of Germany); "it would be inconceivable to draft a convention which did not
include a provision of the kind contemplated in article 36" (Brazil); representative
"could not conceive of a convention which provided the first international codification
of the law concerning consular relations and which did not make provision for free
communication between consular officials and nationals of the sending State" (Syria);
subject of Article 36 "was too important to be passed over in silence" (Congo,
Leopoldville); it was "essential that the convention should contain a provision on so
important a matter as communication and contact between the consulate and nationals
of the sending State" (Italy); "Article 36 was one of the most important in the
convention" (Thailand); "Article 36 was of the greatest importance" (Congo,
Brazzaville); "it was essential that the convention should contain an article dealing
with one of the principal consular functions" (Mali); "the provisions of Article 36 were
an essential part of the convention" (Austria); "attach[ing] the greatest importance to
article 36 and to its inclusion in the convention" (Switzerland).
Joint Brief for Defendant-Appellant Gregory Madej and Intervenor-Appellant the Consul General
for the Republic of Poland in Chicago at 17 n. 11, People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (I11. 2000)
(citing Official Records I, at 81-86, IT 45, 59, 69, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 88, 92, 94, 96, 99).
272. Breard 1!, 134 F.3d. 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curium)
(Butzner, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he language is mandatory and unequivocal, evidencing
the signatories' recognition of the importance of consular access for persons detained by a foreign
government").
273. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
274. Amnesty Int'l, Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1997, Death Penalty
Worldwide, Amnesty International, available at http://www.amnest.org/ailib/aipub/1998/ACT/
A5000498.htmI.
275. Joint Brief for Defendant-Appellant Gregory Madej and Intervenor-Appellant the Consul
General for the Republic of Poland in Chicago at 51, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87752, 87725, 87726).
276. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 432 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
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his affest.277  Specifically, in uncontradicted affidavits, 78  Poland
indicated that it would have arranged for Madej to avoid the death
penalty. 279 Additionally, Poland's interest in seeking to intervene was
to preserve the Vienna Convention rights of both Madej and the
Republic of Poland. 280  Accordingly, the court should have accorded
Madej a remedy that would have compensated for the lack of legal
representation from and communication with the Polish authorities.
Furthermore, other countries are concerned about the United States
violating the right to consular notification.281 While Madej's appeal to
the Illinois Supreme Court was pending, the Consulate General of the
Federal Republic of Germany in Chicago, the Human Rights Committee
of the Bar of England and Wales, and the United Mexican States filed
277. Petitioner's Joint Brief at 43, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87752, 87725, 87726).
278. Id.
279. Id. The Petitioner's Joint Brief indicated that the Consul General
provided a detailed account of the importance of the Vienna Convention and the
Consular Convention, and attested that the Polish Consulate could have provided
significant assistance to Gregory Madej had he requested it. Indeed, in his
uncontradicted affidavit, the Consul General explained that (1) the Polish Consulate
could have addressed the Illinois authorities, and thereby persuaded them not to pursue
the death penalty; and (2) the Polish Consulate could have arranged for an attorney
with experience in death penalty cases to represent Gregory Madej. Furthermore, the
Consul General attested that the Polish Consulate or a properly qualified attorney
(arranged for by the Polish Consulate) could have (3) advised Gregory Madej to accept
the State's plea bargain; (4) advised Gregory Madej of his rights against self-
incrimination and his right to decided whether or not to testify; (5) advised Gregory
Madej not to waive jury sentencing, or at a minimum, advise him of the one-juror rule;
and (6) assisted in obtaining mitigating evidence for presentation during sentencing.
Id. at 43-44 (citations omitted).
280. Id. at 5 1. The Petitioner noted that:
More individuals of Polish origin live in the Chicago area than in any other city in the
world outside of Warsaw. Because thousands of Polish nationals and Polish-
Americans currently live in the Chicago area, the interest of the Consul General in this
case extends also to his treaty rights to render consular assistance to the large numbers
of Polish nationals who reside in or visit Illinois.
Id. (footnote omitted).
281. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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briefs as amici curiae.282 These, and other countries,283 are concerned
about consular notification violations, especially in the context of death
penalty cases. 284  Thus, given this international attention, the court
should have addressed a remedy for Illinois' violation of the Vienna
Convention, thus easing the international community's concerns about
such state violations.
282. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in
Chicago, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87725, 87726, 87752); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Human Rights
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales in Support of the Defendant-Appellant, Madej (Nos.
87574, 87725, 87726, 87752); Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican States, Madej (Nos.
(Nos. 87574, 87725, 87726, 87752). The German Consul in Chicago argued that they were not
only protesting Illinois' violation of the Vienna Convention, but they were also opposed to the
imposition of the death penalty on foreign nationals. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Consulate
General of the Federal Republic of Germany in Chicago at 5, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87725, 87726,
87752). The German Consul further maintained that in situations where measures were taken to
safeguard the rights of foreign nationals, "'[clapital punishment may only be carried out pursuant
to a final judgement [sic] rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives all
possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial... ' Id. at 4 (citing Safeguards Guaranteeing
Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, U.N. Economic and Social Council,
E/RES/1984/50, 25 May 1984, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/ab/
h_comp4l.htm). Failure to take cautious measures, Germany further maintained, must result in
"restoring the status quo ante, meaning that the situation as it existed before the detention, trial,
sentencing and conviction of the foreign national must be re-established." Id. at 5. This means,
at the least, setting aside the death penalty sentence. Id. The Brief Submitted by England and
Wales similarly argued that a breach of the Vienna Convention should be rectified by returning
the petitioner to the position in the lawsuit before the breach occurred. Brief of Amicus Curiae
the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales in Support of the Defendant-
Appellant, at 11-13, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87725, 87726, 87752). Additionally, England and
Wales argued that a state should not prevent a foreign national from having his rights afforded to
him. Id. at 19-20. The United Mexican States also argued that restitutio in integrum provided the
proper relief for a state violation of international law. Brief Amicus Curiae of the United
Mexican States at 8, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87725, 87726, 87752). Mexico pointed out the United
States intervention in the Harry Wu case in China. Id. at 5. Mexico also noted that the United
States protested China's refusal to allow consular access to Wu, who was imprisoned based on
the fact Wu was a U.S. national and allegedly spied on the Chinese government. Id. Mexico
argued, given the United States recognition of these important rights afforded to foreign nationals,
the United States should similarly be prohibited from disallowing consular access to foreign
nationals in the United States. Id. at 7.
283. Other countries include Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic,
Honduras, Paraguay, and Costa Rica. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
284. The Amicus Curiae Brief for Germany stated, "While the right to consular notification is
guaranteed to all foreign national detainees, it is critical in cases where the foreign national is
charged with a crime that may carry a death sentence." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Consulate
General of the Federal Republic of Germany in Chicago at 5, Madej (Nos. 87574, 87725, 87726,
87752). Currently, "over 80 reported foreign nationals are on death row in the USA. Fourteen
non-US citizens have been put to death across the country in the past decade, II of whom were
executed between 1997 and 1999." Worlds Apart, supra note 10, at *2.
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3. The International Ramifications for U.S. Citizens Abroad
The majority failed to recognize that by not providing a remedy for
the state's notification violation, United States citizens are potentially at
risk of having their freedom and safety compromised.285 Failure to
honor such treaties on the part of the United States can seriously
jeopardize the safety and freedom of American citizens abroad.286 The
implications of decisions like the one in Madej reach far beyond the
execution of one defendant. 287 It is in the best interest of the United
States to adhere to the notification requirements in the Vienna
Convention for the simple reason that it helps to ensure that other
nations will do the same with United States citizens abroad.288
Moreover, as one court has pointed out, the integrity of our judicial
system depends on adhering to our international treaty obligations. 289
Clearly, the court in Madej failed to provide the defendant with the
needed resources and protection, and in doing so, the court potentially
jeopardized the safety of United States citizens abroad.
V. IMPACT
The Madej ruling does not preclude a foreign national in Illinois from
obtaining a timely remedy under the Vienna Convention. 290
Nonetheless, state violations of the Vienna Convention have caused a
great outcry of disapproval from foreign countries and human rights
organizations. 291 Within the United States judicial system, an increase
in litigation on these claims will inevitably produce a claim that is not
procedurally preempted and force the courts to conceive a remedy for
state violations. 292 Moreover, the international reaction to United States
treaty violations will pressure the United States into taking concrete
measures to ensure treaty compliance. 293
285. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 430 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
286. Id. at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
287. Id. at 432 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 432 (Heiple, J.,
dissenting).
289. United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"[f]aithful adherence to our treaty obligations is important not only to the foreign relations of the
United States but also to the integrity of our criminal justice system").
290. Supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the majority's correct application of Illinois procedural
law).
291. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
292. O'Driscoll, supra note 13, at 339.
293. Infra Part V.B (discussing the international reaction to the Madej holding and similar
rulings).
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A. Domestic Impact
Although the Vienna Convention treaty was ratified in the United
States in 1969, the United States State Department did not come out
with a manual on consular notification and access until
1998-seventeen years after Madej's arrest.294 While the treaty imparts
a duty on both the local and federal government and law enforcement,
there is a strong duty on the part of the federal government to provide
local governments with direction, especially in situations involving
international law. 295  Without such direction, courts will develop
judicially-imposed tests to avoid directly interpreting the rights and
responsibilities of parties under the Vienna Convention. 296  Courts do
this, generally, because they do not interact on an international level,
and, therefore, it is difficult for them to envision the larger national and
international ramifications of their rulings.297  Hence, only when the
high courts impart a mandatory directive on the states will a clear
remedy be available. 298  Until then, the over eighty reported foreign
nationals on death row299 will await their execution.
B. International Reaction and Impact Abroad
While top United States officials have expressed little concern about
any fallout the United States has with foreign governments, 3°° the
impact abroad may prove more antagonistic than originally thought.30 1
294. State Department Manual, supra note 5.
295. Vadnais, supra note 134, at 332-34.
296. Supra Part lI.B (discussing judicially-imposed tests on Vienna Convention claims).
297. Gisvold, supra note 36, at 796 (stating that state courts "cannot adequately judge how
their actions may affect the broader federal interests at stake").
298. Trainer, supra note 141, at 269.
299. Worlds Apart, supra note 10, at *2.
300. Associated Press, Legal Wrangling Keeps German Citizen Inches Away from Death,
(Mar. 3, 1999) (Arizona Governor Jane Hull indicated that "she was not worried about any fallout
to Arizona's image overseas" based on Arizona's violation of the Vienna Convention that led to
the execution of two German foreign nationals), at http://www.cnn.comiUS/9903/03/
arizona.execution.04/index.html; see also Associated Press, Death Row Debate: Is Treaty
Obeyed? (Dec. 28, 1998) (Former Texas Governor George Bush was "unmoved" by a foreign
national's plea for a stay of execution in Texas, stating, "'People can't just come in our state and
cold-blood [sic] murder somebody .... That's unacceptable behavior, regardless of their
nationality."'), at http://www.cnn.com/US/9812/28/death.row.diplomacy/index.html.
301. Gisvold, supra note 36, at 792. Gisvold states that "[ejach State must weigh the risk of
noncompliance against the retaliatory effect of noncompliance by other States." Id. at 792.
Former U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin said, "'[i]f we don't do all we can to...
tell foreign nationals here that they can have consular access, then American citizens around the
world ... could be missing out on important opportunities to defend themselves through such
notification of our consulates and embassies."' Associated Press, Death Row Debate: Is Treaty
Obeyed? (Dec. 28, 1998), at http://www.cnn.com/US/9812/28/death.row.diplomacy/index.html.
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This notion of international reciprocity is a core issue confronting
United States treaty violations. 30 2 It is possible that it is only a matter of
time before a foreign state decides to retaliate against the United
States.30 3 This scenario is highly probable given the blatant disregard
for Vienna Convention violations.30 4 If the United States is to insist that
other countries meet the standards set by the Vienna Convention, then
"compliance must begin at home." 305
C. Prevention and Remedies
The Illinois Supreme Court had its hands tied in Madej. The time for
bringing the Vienna Convention claim had expired under section 2-
1401.306 Such dilemmas could be avoided by taking greater measures to
prevent state violations of the Vienna Convention. Furthermore, courts
must afford some remedy to foreign nationals who were deprived of
their right to consular access, especially when the violation possibly
contributes to their execution.
There are a number of ways that the United States can prevent state
violations of the Vienna Convention. Within the past few years, the
United States State Department has made efforts to inform local law
enforcement officials about the rights of foreign nationals under the
Vienna Convention.30 7  The State Department and other federal
302. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 431 (Il. 2000) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
303. Gisvold, supra note 36, at 794 (stating that, "It is only a matter of time before a nation
decides to retaliate for maltreatment of one of its nationals by the United States"). Gisvold goes
on to state:
Currently, the United States is both a leading champion and violator of the right to
consular protection. The United States must act to remedy this grave inconsistency.
Justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of a defendant's nationality and lack
of familiarity with our legal precepts, the state denies him the occasion to fully
participate in the judicial proceedings against him.
Id. at 803.
304. O'Driscoll, supra note 13, at 340. Contra Charlie Condon & Gerald Le Melle, At Issue,
Capital Controversy: Is it Acceptable to Execute Foreign Nationals?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at 36
(stating that "[mioral bullying based on international law is unlikely to convince many Americans
[not to execute foreign nationals when] that runs contrary to their legal tradition").
305. Gisvold, supra note 36, at 794; see also Christopher E. van der Waerden, Death and
Diplomacy: Paraguay v. United States and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 45
WAYNE L. REV. 1631, 1663 (1999) (stating that "[w]hile many of these recent cases involve
horrific crimes justifying harsh punishment, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention remains a
'diplomatic golden rule,' and the United States must treat foreign nations in our justice system as
we expect other nations to treat Americans abroad").
306. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 426.
307. State Department Manual, supra note 5. The State Department Manual describes itself
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agencies can also monitor and facilitate compliance through training
programs and regular publications. 30 8  Notices regarding international
obligations should be sent out annually, instead of merely
periodically. 3°9 Furthermore, enacting legislation, while not necessary
to implement obligations, may facilitate a stricter implementation. 310
Also, incorporating foreign national's rights into Miranda warnings, or
other routinely publicized rights, could be feasibly implemented.31'
A state violation of the Vienna Convention also necessitates a
remedy. 312  Courts have held that dismissal of an indictment and
suppression of evidence are inappropriate remedies for a treaty
violation,313 but these courts have not made another remedy
available. 314 The dissents in Madej found that the most practical and
equitable remedy would be to vacate the death sentence 315 and remand
designed to help ensure that foreign governments can extend appropriate consular
services to their nationals in the United States and that the United States complies with
its legal obligations to such governments. The instructions and guidance herein should
be followed by all federal, state, and local government officials, whether law
enforcement, judicial, or other, insofar as they pertain to foreign nationals subject to
such officials' authority or to matters within such officials' competence.
Id. at i. Additionally, the State Department Manual lists the duties of the state when detaining a
foreign national as:
1. When foreign nationals are arrested or detained, they must be advised of the right
to have their consular officials notified.
2. In some cases, the nearest consular officials must be notified of the arrest or
detention of a foreign national, regardless of the national's wishes.
3. Consular officials are entitled to have access to their nations in detention, and are
entitled to provide consular assistance.
4. When a government official becomes aware of the death of a foreign national,
consular officials must be notified.
5. When a guardianship or trusteeship is being considered with respect to a foreign
national who is a minor or incompetent, consular officials must be notified.
6. When a foreign ship or aircraft wrecks or crashes, consular officials must be
notified.
Id. at 13-15.
308. Aceves, supra note 58, at 314.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work: Universal Instruments of Human Rights and Consular
Protection in the Context of Criminal Justice, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 375, 423 (1997).
312. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423, 431 (II1. 2000) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (stating that "[i]t is in our own self-interest to uphold the principle of
international comity, acknowledge the notification violations that occurred in the case at bar, and
provide a remedy").
313. Supra Part II.B.4 (discussing inappropriate remedies for state violations of the Vienna
Convention).
314. Kadish, supra note 108, at 609-10.
315. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 431 (McMorrow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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the case for a new trial in compliance with the Vienna Convention.316
Additionally, the Governor has the ability to pardon or reduce the
sentence of a death row inmate when state violations materially alter or
prejudice a foreign national's case.317  Also, there is the option of
repatriation to Poland, which was suggested in Justice Bilandic's
concurring opinion. 318  Habeas corpus relief may also be sought in
capital criminal cases. 319 At a minimum, a remedy is required that
allows foreign nationals to have access to the "cultural bridge"
envisioned by the Vienna Convention. 320 Unfortunately, only when the
United States Supreme Court gives lower courts a mandatory directive
will a clear remedy be properly applied. 321
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority correctly held that the Illinois state procedural rules
barred the Vienna Convention violation claim. The language of the
Vienna Convention and Illinois' procedural rules require this
conclusion. The majority reached its holding by properly avoiding
doctrinal provincialism and the application of unnecessary judicially-
imposed tests. Strong policy arguments exist, however, for courts to
overlook procedural obstacles, such as section 2-1401 in Madej's case,
especially in situations where a state violation of the treaty results in the
execution of a foreign national. Illinois courts must devise such
remedies to afford accused foreign nationals sufficient fairness under
the treaty. In turn, the international reaction to U.S. violations of the
Vienna Convention will be eased and the freedom and safety of United
States citizens abroad will not be jeopardized.
316. Id. at 432 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
317. The Governor of Illinois, George Ryan, declared a moratorium on executions in Illinois,
effective as of January 2000, due to the "shameful" record of wrongful convictions. Worlds
Apart, supra note 10, at *18 n.l.
318. Madej, 739 N.E.2d at 429 (Bilandic, J., concurring). Furthermore, at the end of this year
two Illinois Supreme Court justices are stepping down and Madej is pending re-hearing. The thin
majority in Madej may turn and provide a remedy for state violations of the Vienna Convention.
319. Kadish, supra note 108, at 610.
320. Id. at 611 (stating that a remedy "necessarily demands a new trial in which the foreign
national has full access to the 'cultural bridge' envisioned by the world delegates of the Vienna
Convention").
321. Trainer, supra note 141, at 269.
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